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1 Introduction
The introduction of technology into voting systems can bring a number of benefits, such
as improving accessibility, remote voting and efficient, accurate processing of votes. A
voting system which uses electronic technology in any part of processing the votes, from
vote capture and transfer through to vote tallying, is known as an ‘e-voting’ system.
In addition to the undoubted benefits, the introduction of such technology introduces
particular security challenges, some of which are unique to voting systems because of their
specific nature and requirements. The key role that voting systems play in democratic
elections means that such systems must not only be secure and trustworthy, but must
be seen by the electorate to be secure and trustworthy. It is a challenge to reconcile the
secrecy of the ballot with demonstrable correctness of the result.
There are many general challenges involved in running a voting system securely, that
are common to any complex secure system, and any implementation will need to take
account of these. Over and above these, we introduce a particular approach to address-
ing the challenge of demonstrating trustworthiness, around the key idea of ‘end-to-end
verifiability’. This means that every step of the processing of the votes, from vote casting
through to vote tallying, can be independently verified by some agent independent of the
voting system itself. In particular, the output of the system can be checked, and so the
integrity of the election does not need to rely on the trustworthiness or competence of
the system and its programmers, but can be demonstrated independently. ‘Individual
c©2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This chapter appears in the Computer and Information
Security Handbook, 2nd edition, John R. Vacca (ed), Elsevier.
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verification’ of a step is when an individual voter is able to perform some check that their
vote was handled correctly. ‘Universal verifiability’ of a step is when any external party
is able to check that the step has been carried out correctly. Typically, end-to-end veri-
fiability of a system will include both of these kinds of verifiability. Verifiability provides
an assurance that the result of the election is correct and accurate.
This chapter shows how verifiability can be provided within a voting system, by
introducing several verifiable voting schemes that have been proposed. Section 2 first
discusses the many security requirements on voting systems and the relationships between
them. As well as verifiability, requirements include ballot secrecy, integrity, coercion-
resistance and usability among others. These requirements are often in tension, and
part of the challenge of designing an e-voting system is to find ways of reconciling them.
Section 3 then introduces the different kinds of verifiable voting schemes. Cryptographic
mechanisms are used by many schemes in order to achieve particular goals, and this is
the topic of Section 4. A simple example would be to provide the voter with a receipt
of how they voted in order to allow individual verifiability. In order to maintain secrecy
of the ballot (even if the voter wants to prove how she voted, for example to sell the
vote), the receipt could be encrypted to mask the information. The section introduces
more sophisticated cryptographic mechanisms that are used, including: secret sharing
to distribute trust (no individual party has total access to a critical secret such as the
election secret key); zero-knowledge proofs for verification (allowing a check that an
operation on a secret has been done correctly without giving away secret information);
mixnets, to shuﬄe and decrypt a set of votes so no decrypted vote can be linked to its
original encryption. An overview of several noteworthy schemes are then introduced in
Section 5, and the development of a particular scheme, Preˆt a` Voter, is introduced in
more detail in Section 6 to illustrate in more detail the considerations that go into the
design of a verifiable e-voting scheme. We consider threats to such schemes in Section 7
before concluding in Section 8.
2 Security Requirements
While e-voting systems often vary widely in design and operation, they generally converge
on a standard set of security requirements. These requirements are difficult to capture
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and there is no consensus as yet on precise definitions. Intuitive definitions of some
important security properties are as follows.
– Ballot secrecy: only the voter should know how she voted.
– Legitimacy: only registered voters may vote.
– Eligibility: a voter may vote at most once and all votes cast are genuine.
– Individual verifiability: the voter should be able to check that her vote is
accurately recorded for tabulation.
– Universal verifiability: the final tally should be verifiable by any third party.
– Accuracy (Integrity): the announced tally should reflect the true count of all
legitimate, cast votes.
– Receipt-freeness: a voter should not be able to prove her vote.
– Coercion resistance: A voting system is coercion resistant if the voter can vote
the way she wants to, even while appearing to cooperate with the coercer.
– Robustness: the system should be able to deliver the correct result even in
the event of certain, suitably defined, levels of failure of corruption.
– Availability: users should be able to access all features of a fully-functioning
system during the election.
2.1 Inter-relationships and conflicts
These properties are not wholly independent. For example, ballot secrecy and anonymity
can be regarded as special cases of confidentiality or privacy; individual and universal
verifiability together imply integrity.
Coercion-resistance is a stronger form of receipt-freeness, which can be described as
the inability of a voter to prove how she voted. For coercion-resistance to hold, the voter
must be able to vote for her chosen candidates even if she appears to cooperate with the
adversary during the whole voting process, from the time before the vote is cast until the
final result is published.
Further explanation and discussion of these properties can be found in [57].
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Observe also that tensions exist between certain properties, most markedly ballot
secrecy and individual verifiability. While the requirement exists for ballot secrecy, it
should also be possible to publicly verify the accuracy of both vote recording and tallying.
It is a challenge to reconcile these two requirements.
2.2 Achieving system security
At a high level, any verifiable supervised scheme can be divided into two parts. At the
front-end, voters interact with the voting client to generate their encrypted votes and
then submit their votes to the voting system. At the back-end, the received votes are
tallied and the election result is announced. Note that voters only need to be involved in
the front-end, while they need not be concerned with the back-end.
2.2.1 Challenges
The privacy, receipt-freeness and integrity properties need to be considered in both the
front-end and the back-end. In the front-end, the voter’s intent should not be leaked, even
if the voter wants to prove it to others. This requires the encrypted vote to be generated
at some supervised and controlled environment, such as a voting booth. Otherwise,
adversaries who see how the encrypted vote is generated will learn the voter’s intent.
Moreover, the receipt should only contain the encrypted vote, but not the plaintext
intent. In the back-end, if each vote is decrypted individually at the end of the tally, the
relationships between the received encrypted votes and the decrypted votes have to be
kept private, e.g., using mixnets. Or the homomorphic property can be used to combine
received encrypted votes so that no individual vote will be decrypted at the end of the
tally.
In the majority of verifiable schemes, the encrypted votes are encoded using encryption
algorithms. Although different key lengths can be carefully selected based on different
Note that the Farnel scheme [2] has introduced another interesting design philosophy for the receipt.
Instead of each voter being provided with a receipt which contains her own encrypted vote, the voter
will be given a random receipt which contains another voter’s vote. Hence the receipt can contain the
plaintext intent. However, because some receipts may not be given to any of the voters and they can be
removed without being detected, Farnel is not fully verifiable, and we do not discuss it further in this
chapter.
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security requirements, this only provides computational privacy. If adversaries have un-
limited computational resources, they are able to decrypt the encrypted votes on the
WBB directly. Therefore, as the computational power increases and better breaking al-
gorithms are introduced, today’s encrypted votes might be decrypted some time later
without using the secret key. For this reason, some researchers advocate the everlast-
ing privacy property which ensures unconditional privacy that does not depend on the
strength of encryption. To achieve this property, the encrypted vote could be encoded
using unconditionally hiding bit commitments instead of encryption.
2.2.2 Compromises
An e-voting system may only satisfy a subset of the desirable security properties. Sim-
ilarly, a system may only partially satisfy a certain property or it may satisfy a weaker
form of the property.
For example, a system may be receipt-free but not coercion-resistant: a coercer may
be able to obtain a voter’s credentials and vote in her place. Therefore, even if the scheme
is receipt-free it is not coercion-resistant. Coercion-resistance is also difficult to achieve
in remote e-voting schemes if the entire voting process is unsupervised, as there is no
sure way to exclude outside influence during voting. A few solutions to the problem
have been devised and are discussed in Section 5.6. However, their implementation is not
straightforward, and in some cases such as for complex voting methods like STV, they
may be computationally infeasible in practice.
If Internet voting is required the voting administrators may have to accept the pos-
sibility of coercion. However, coercion may not be considered a serious threat in the
particular voting community. It is a case of balancing system requirements against the
achievable level of security, recognising and accepting the possible threats.
Absolute ballot secrecy is another strong requirement that is not always possible to
achieve, for example when the outcome of voting is unanimous. Likewise a compromise
may need to be reached between ballot secrecy and for example, introducing human
assistance and/or audio/visual aids for disabled voters. The threat then arises of an
official and/or device “learning” a vote. If legislation demands increased accessibility,
then there is no choice but to implement the (typically) strong safeguards on equipment
that becomes necessary.
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3 Verifiable Voting Schemes
In the literature, although a large number of verifiable voting schemes have been in-
troduced and various techniques have been used in these schemes, many of them share
similar design philosophies. In this section, we review some of the design philosophies for
these verifiable voting schemes. Our focus is verifiable supervised schemes, but we will
also briefly explain verifiable remote voting and its limitations.
3.1 Verifiable supervised schemes
The verifiability property consists of three components: cast-as-intended, recorded-as-
cast and counted-as-recorded. The first two components are related to the front-end,
ensuring that the voter’s encrypted vote is not only correctly generated but also properly
recorded by the election system. The last component is related to the back-end to ensure
that all received encrypted votes are correctly tallied. We now explain how these three
components can be designed in verifiable supervised schemes.
To achieve the cast-as-intended property, the individual voter needs to verify that the
encrypted vote contains her intended vote. One typical strategy is to use the cut-and-
choose method. For example, after an encrypted vote is generated by the voting client,
the voter randomly decides whether to audit it or cast it. Note that if the encrypted vote
is audited, the voter should not be allowed to cast it as her vote. The voter can repeat
the audit process as many times as she like, each time using an independently generated
encrypted vote. After she is satisfied, she requests another encrypted vote and submits
it without auditing. The cut-and-choose method provides probabilistic assurance that
the encrypted vote is correctly generated without cheating on the part of the system.
Another typical strategy requires the voting client to generate a cryptographic proof that
the encryption is correctly performed, and an honest voter will accept the proof if the
encrypted vote is indeed properly generated. This is the approach taken by MarkPledge
discussed in Section 5.4. Different from the cut-and-choose method, this direct audit
gives a much higher assurance that the voting client is honest, and the voter can cast
the vote which has been audited. Auditing is however, normally more complex than the
Note that the voter should not be able to transfer this proof to others. Otherwise, this proof also
proves how this voter has voted.
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cut-and-choose method.
The two auditing methods can be illustrated using a simple analogy: consider the
problem of ensuring an intact fortune cookie contains a fortune. Using cut-and-choose,
when given a fortune cookie you can either break it open (but then it cannot be used
later as a fortune cookie) and check it contains a fortune, or you can decide to accept
it. If you choose to break open several and confirm they all contain a fortune, then you
can be confident when you decide to accept one that this one will also contain a fortune.
Alternatively to cut-and-choose, you may use high-tech X-ray equipment to scan a cookie.
If the result confirms the presence of a fortune, you will have very high assurance that
there is a fortune in the cookie. In this way, no cookie needs to be opened, but it needs
more advanced technology than the previous method.
To achieve the recorded-as-cast property, two requirements are necessary. Firstly,
there needs to be an append-only web bulletin board (WBB) that can be read by the
public but can only be appended by authorised parties. Once some information is written
to it, it cannot be altered or removed. In verifiable schemes, after voters submit their
encrypted votes to the election system, all these votes will be published on the WBB.
Secondly, each voter will be provided with a receipt which contains her encrypted vote.
To verify that her vote has been recorded by the election system, the voter can later check
her receipt against the WBB to verify that her vote has been correctly recorded by the
election system. If not, she can use the receipt to support a complaint to the authorities.
Note that this check is optional. But since the attackers do not know which votes will be
checked, if they remove a few votes before they reach the WBB, this cheating behaviour
will be caught with high probability.
The counted-as-recorded property is achieved by designing the tally phase so that its
entire process is publicly verifiable. In other words, no vote can be added, altered or
removed without being detected. For example, if some invalid votes need to be removed
from the tally, it can be verified by the public that all invalid votes have been removed
and no valid vote has been removed. Moreover, the election result is calculated using the
remaining votes in a publicly verifiable way. Mixnets and homomorphic encryption are
two typical techniques used in the tally phase. They not only ensures the counted-as-
recorded property, but also protects ballot secrecy.
A similar notion to verifiability is software independence [53]: a voting system is
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software independent when the result it reports does not depend at all on the correctness
of its software. In other words, an undetected error or deliberate change in the software
cannot cause an undetected error or change to the election result. Hence the software does
not need to be trusted in order to have confidence in the election result, because its output
can be verified for correctness. Since the software is generally the most complex and
intricate element of an e-voting system, obtaining software-independence is an important
counterbalance to over-reliance on the correctness of the software.
3.2 Verifiable remote schemes
The design philosophy for verifiability is similar in both verifiable supervised and remote
voting schemes. However, because voters will cast their votes in an uncontrolled environ-
ment, e.g., via Internet or post, the receipt-freeness property becomes trickier to achieve.
This is because adversaries may observe the voter when she is casting her vote and find
out how she has voted.
In a low coercion environment, i.e., coercion and vote buying are not serious concerns,
the verifiable remote scheme can be directly designed based on a verifiable supervised
scheme, just ignoring the receipt-freeness property. For example, the voter generates her
encrypted vote and then submits it to the election system through a remote channel.
She can still check that her vote is correctly generated, but without the receipt-freeness
protection, she might be coerced to vote the candidate favoured by adversaries. The
Helios system [1] is an example of a verifiable remote scheme designed for a low coercion
environment.
The receipt-freeness property can be achieved in verifiable remote schemes, but there
needs to be an untappable channel between the voter and the election system, and infor-
mation transmitted through this channel is kept private from others. A popular design
principle is to add a registration phase before the election day. This phase is carried out
within some controlled environment, but the voter can participate in it at any convenient
time. Here we briefly explain the design philosophy of the JCJ/Civitas scheme [35, 18];
its technical details will be further explained in Section 5.6. Each voter will register a
credential in the registration phase. In the voting phase, the voter should first encrypt
her credential and her preferred candidate (as well as some zero-knowledge proofs), and
then submit them to the election system. Because adversaries cannot distinguish a fake
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credential from a real one, when the voter is being coerced, she can use a fake credential
to cast a vote. Note that all votes with fake credentials will be removed from the tally in
a publicly verifiable way after mixing. Later, she can cast her vote again using her real
credential when she is not being coerced. However, this type of scheme also has some
limitations. Firstly, voters need to perform complicated cryptographic calculations both
in the registration phase and in the voting phase. Either voters need to use some trusted
device or they need to possess special knowledge to perform these tasks. Secondly, if the
credential is learnt by any other party, e.g., by the voting client or by adversaries using
social engineering, this party can cast another vote at a later time to overwrite the voter’s
vote.
4 Building Blocks
In this section, we briefly describe some building blocks which are commonly used to
build verifiable voting schemes. These include encryption schemes, secret sharing and
threshold techniques, zero knowledge proofs, mixnets and some other useful techniques,
such as blind signature, designated verifier proof, plaintext equivalent test and proxy
re-encryption.
4.1 Encryption schemes
In public key encryption, anyone can encrypt a message using the public key and the
encrypted message can only be decrypted by the party who possesses the corresponding
secret key. Moreover, some schemes also enjoy the additive homomorphic property which
is a very handy feature in verifiable voting schemes. It allows the received encrypted
votes to be aggregated into a single ciphertext. To tally the election result, only this
single ciphertext is decrypted so that no individual vote will be revealed.
4.1.1 RSA cipher
The RSA cipher [54] works as follows: let p and q be two large primes, where n = pq
and φ = (p − 1)(q − 1). We first select a random value e, such that 1 < e < φ and
gcd(e, φ) = 1. Then by applying the extended Euclidean algorithm, we can compute a
value d such that 1 < d < φ and ed ≡ 1 (mod φ). Now, the RSA public key is (n, e) and
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the corresponding secret key is d. To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Zn, we can compute the
ciphertext as c = me (mod n). To decrypt c, the party who knows the secret key d can
compute cd = med = mkφ+1 = m (mod n). RSA enjoys the multiplicative homomorphic
property. For example, if E(m1) and E(m2) are two RSA ciphertexts with plaintexts m1
and m2, then we have E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 ·m2). RSA is a deterministic public-key
encryption scheme, and its security is based on the factoring problem.
4.1.2 ElGamal cipher
The ElGamal cipher [25] works as follows: let p, q be two large primes such that q|p−1. We
denote Gq as the subgroup of Z
∗
p with order q. Let g be a generator of Gq. The secret key
is an element x ∈ Zq and the corresponding public key is y = gx (mod p). In this chap-
ter, if we apply the ElGamal parameters, we assume all arithmetic to be modulo p where
applicable, unless otherwise stated. To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Gq, we choose a random
blinding factor r ∈ Zq and compute the ciphertext E(m, r) = (G,M) = (myr, gr). Note
that an ElGamal ciphertext is a pair of values of Gq. To decrypt the ElGamal ciphertext
(G,M), we compute m = G/Mx. ElGamal enjoys the multiplicative homomorphic prop-
erty, and it is a probabilistic public-key encryption scheme, which is semantically secure
if the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the group Gq.
ElGamal re-encryption: Given an ElGamal ciphertext (G,M) = (myr, gr), a party can
efficiently compute a new ciphertext (G′,M ′) that decrypts to the same plaintext as
(G,M). We denote that the ciphertext (G′,M ′) is a re-encryption of (G,M). To re-
encrypt a ciphertext, the party chooses a value s ∈ Zq uniformly at random and computes
(G′,M ′) = (G ·ys,M ·gs). We note that this does not require the knowledge of the secret
key x, only the public parameters y and g are needed.
Exponential ElGamal cipher: This is a variant of the ElGamal cipher with an additional
parameter h which is also a generator of the group Gq. To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Zq,
we randomly choose a blinding factor r ∈ Zq and calculate the ciphertext as E(m, r) =
(G,M) = (hmyr, gr). The decryption process is the same as in the ElGamal cipher, but
In deterministic encryption, the same plaintext will always be encrypted to the same ciphertext. In
contrast, the same plaintext can be encrypted to different ciphertexts using probabilistic encryption.
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there is no efficient algorithm to retrieve the plaintext m from hm. Instead, if m is known
to be restricted within some field, we can search the field or use pre-computed lookup
tables to retrieve m.
The exponential ElGamal cipher can be re-encrypted in the same way. But differently
to the ElGamal cipher, it enjoys the additive homomorphic property. For example, if
E(m1) and E(m2) are two exponential ElGamal ciphertexts with plaintexts m1 and m2,
then we have E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2) and E(m1)k = E(k ·m1).
4.1.3 Paillier cipher
The Paillier cipher [48] works as follows: let n be an RSA modulus n = pq, where p, q
are large primes. Let g be an integer of order a multiple of n modulo n2. The public key
is (g, n), and the secret key is λ = lcm((p− 1), (q − 1)). To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn,
we randomly choose x ∈ Z∗n and compute the ciphertext c = gmxn (mod n2). To decrypt
c, we compute m = L(cλ mod n2)/L(gλ mod n2) (mod n), where the L-function takes
input values from the set Sn = {u < n2|u = 1 (mod n)} and computes L(u) = (u−1)/n.
Clearly the Paillier cipher also enjoys the additive homomorphic property, but is superior
to the exponential ElGamal cipher in that it is able to retrieve the plaintext directly after
the decryption.
Paillier re-encryption: Given a Paillier ciphertext c = gmxn (mod n2), we can re-
encryption it without knowledge of the secret key λ. Firstly, we randomly select a value
t ∈ Z∗n, and then we calculate c′ = c×tn = gm{tx}n (mod n2). Now, c′ is an re-encryption
of c.
4.2 Secret sharing and threshold techniques
In secret sharing and threshold techniques, the secret information (e.g., the secret key) is
shared among several parties and a quorum of these parties can work together to recover
the information. Their difference is that in secret sharing, there needs to be a trusted
authority to distribute the secret information among all the parties. But in threshold
techniques, no trusted authority is needed, and all parties can work together to generate
the secret information and distribute it among themselves. Here, we review some basic
secret sharing techniques and the threshold ElGamal. Note that the threshold RSA and
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threshold Paillier are also feasible, but they are more complex. Refer to [8, 64, 27, 23]
for their technical details.
4.2.1 Shamir’s secret sharing
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [63] is the fundamental building block for many other
secret sharing and threshold techniques. It works as follows: if we want to find out the
solution of polynomial f(z) = f0 +f1z+ · · ·+fk−1zk−1 of degree k−1, we need to find out
every value of (f0, f1, . . . , fk−1). Therefore, we need to find out at least k pairs of (zi,mi)
values such that for each pair, we have f(zi) = mi. Therefore, if we set f0 as the secret
m, we can generate any number of mi, such that m1 = f(1),m2 = f(2), . . . ,mn = f(n).
Given any subset of k of these mi values, we can find out all the coefficients of f(z) by
interpolation. But on the other hand, knowledge of at most k− 1 of these values will not
enable the calculation of f0.
By using the Lagrange interpolation, the polynomial can be written as:
f(z) =
k∑
i=1
(mi
k∏
j=1,j 6=i
z − zj
zi − zj )
Therefore
m =
k∑
i=1
miLi
where
Li =
k∏
j=1,j 6=i
j
j − i
4.2.2 Verifiable secret sharing
Verifiable secret sharing [24] is based on Shamir’s secret sharing, but it enjoys an ad-
ditional advantage: all parties can verify that the secret has been properly distributed.
The authority first generates the ElGamal secret key x ∈ Zq, where y = gx and then
distributes x among a number of parties using the Shamir’s secret sharing. Let
f(z) = f0 + f1z + · · ·+ fk−1zk−1
where f0 = x. For i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, the authority also computes each Fi = gfi and
makes these values public. Then the authority can destroy the secret information x. At
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this moment, any party can check whether her given secret share is correctly constructed.
Suppose the j-th party has been assigned the share xj. She verifies that
gxj =
k−1∏
l=0
Fj
jl
If the share is properly constructed, the above equation will always hold because
gxj = gf0+f1·j+···+fk−1·j
k−1
=
k−1∏
l=0
gfl·j
l
=
k−1∏
l=0
Fj
jl
4.2.3 Threshold ElGamal
The threshold ElGamal [50] works as follows: at the beginning, n parties (P1, P2, . . . , Pn)
need to agree on the ElGamal parameters (p, q, g). Recall that p and q are large primes,
where q|p − 1, and g is a generator of Gq. Then they work together to implement the
following processes:
1. Pi randomly chooses xi ∈ Zq and computes yi = gxi .
2. The public key y is computed as y =
∏n
i=1 yi. Now all parties know the public
key y, but they cannot find out the corresponding secret key x =
∑n
i=1 xi (mod q)
unless they all work together. The next step is how to distribute x to all parties in
a verifiable way that any subset of k parties can recover it.
3. Pi randomly chooses a polynomial fi(z) ∈ Zq(z) of degree at most k − 1 such that
fi(0) = xi. Let
fi(z) = f(i,0) + f(i,1)z + · · ·+ f(i,k−1)zk−1
where f(i,0) = xi.
4. Pi computes F(i,j) = g
f(i,j) for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and broadcasts (F(i,j))j=1,2,...,k−1.
(Note that F(i,0) = yi is known beforehand.)
5. After every party broadcasts the k−1 values in the previous step, Pi sends sij = fi(j)
and a signature secretly to every other party Pj where j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (Note that
in particular, Pi keeps sii.)
6. Pi verifies that the share sji received from Pj is consistent with the previously
published values by verifying that
gsji =
k−1∏
l=0
F i
l
(j,l)
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This is because that
gsji = gf(j,0)+f(j,1)i+···+f(j,k−1)i
k−1
=
k−1∏
l=0
gf(j,l)i
l
=
k−1∏
l=0
F i
l
(j,l)
If this check fails, Pi broadcasts that an error has been found, publishes sji and the
signature, and then stops.
7. Pi computes her share of the secret key as the sum of all shares received in step 5
as
si =
n∑
j=1
sji (mod q)
As follows, Pi signs the public key y. Finally, after all parties have signed y, anyone
can check whether y is agreed among all these parties.
4.3 Zero-knowledge proofs
A zero-knowledge proof allows the prover to prove some fact to the verifier without
revealing the secret details of the fact. According to the definitions in “Handbook of
Applied Cryptography” [38], it should achieve the following three properties:
• Completeness: Given an honest prover and an honest verifier, the protocol will
succeed with overwhelming probability. The definition of overwhelming depends
on the application, but generally implies that the probability of failure is not of
practical significance.
• Soundness: If there exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm with the follow-
ing property: if a dishonest prover can with non-negligible probability successfully
execute the protocol with the honest verifier, then the same algorithm can be used
to extract some knowledge which is essentially equivalent to the honest prover’s
secret.
• Zero-knowledge: There exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm which can
produce, upon input of the assertion to be proven but without interacting with the
real prover, transcripts indistinguishable from those resulting from interaction with
the real prover.
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4.3.1 Interactive proofs and Fiat-Shamir heuristics
Generally speaking, an interactive zero-knowledge proof works as follows:
1. The prover sends a witness to the verifier. The witness works as a commitment in
the protocol.
2. The verifier sends a challenge back to the prover. The challenge could be the
outcome of fair coin toss.
3. The prover sends a response to the verifier. The calculation of the response needs
to take into account the witness, the challenge and the secret.
In the interactive zero-knowledge proof, both the prover and the verifier need to be
present during the execution of the protocol. Sometimes, it will be more convenient if the
prover can generate a transcript of the protocol so that the verifier can verify it at some
later time. By using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [26], this can be achieved by transferring
an interactive proof into a non-interactive proof. The non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof (NIZKP) normally works as follows:
1. The prover generates a witness.
2. The prover takes the witness as well as some other necessary information as inputs,
and outputs the challenge using some hash function.
3. The prover calculates the response and then sends the transcript which includes
the witness, the challenge and the response to the verifier.
The security of NIZKP, which can be proved using the Random Oracle Model [4],
is based on the fact that the verifier cannot predict the outcome of the hash function.
Otherwise, she can fabricate a proof which will be accepted by the verifier.
In the following paragraphs, we describe several zero-knowledge proofs in the interac-
tive form. They can be transferred into non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs similarly
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics.
Here, we only illustrate the technique using examples of three-round interactive proofs. Some proofs
may have more rounds, but their concept is similar.
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4.3.2 Schnorr Identification Algorithm
The Schnorr Identification Algorithm [62] is widely used to prove the knowledge of the
ElGamal secret key without revealing it. The basic theory is as follows: suppose p, q are
two large primes where q|p− 1. Let g be a generator of group Gq which is a subgroup of
Z∗p . Suppose x ∈ Zq is the secret key, and y = gx is the corresponding public key. The
prover P can prove that she knows x without disclosing it to the verifier V .
1. P randomly chooses a value c ∈ Zq, and sends w = gc to V .
2. V sends a random challenge e ∈ Zq back to P .
3. P calculates s = c+ xe (mod q), and sends s to V .
4. V checks gs = wye.
Moreover, for an ElGamal ciphertext (G,M) = (myr, gr), the Schnorr Identification
Algorithm also can be used to prove knowledge of its plaintext m without revealing it.
The protocol first proves that P knows the blinding factor r in gr. Because y is a public
parameter, if P knows r, she can retrieve m by calculating m = G/yr. Therefore, the
protocol also proves that P knows the plaintext m.
4.3.3 Chaum-Pedersen protocol
The Chaum-Pedersen protocol [16] is used to prove the equality of discrete logarithm.
Suppose (g, y) is the ElGamal public key pair and the secret key is x = loggy. By
using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol, the prover P can prove to the verifier V that a pair
(m,n) achieves the following property: loggy = logmn = x. We denote such a proof as
CP(g, y,m, n).
1. P randomly chooses a value c ∈ Zq, then he sends U = gc and V = mc to V .
2. V sends a random challenge e ∈ Zq back to P .
3. P calculates s = c+ xe (mod q), and sends s to V .
4. V checks gs = Uye and ms = V ne.
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The Chaum-Pedersen protocol also can be used to prove that an ElGamal ciphertext
(G′,M ′) = (Gys,Mgs) is a re-encryption of (G,M) = (myr, gr) without revealing the
randomisation factor s. The proof is CP(y,G′/G, g,M ′/M) which implies that there
exists a value s such that logy(G
′/G) = logg(M ′/M). Moreover, the Chaum-Pedersen
protocol can be used to prove that an ElGamal ciphertext has been correctly decrypted.
4.3.4 Cramer-Damg˚ard-Schoenmakers protocol
The witness hiding/indistinguishable protocol was introduced by Cramer, Damg˚ard and
Schoenmakers in [20], therefore it is also known as the CDS protocol. It can be used to
prove that a party knows the solution of k out of n problems without revealing which
problems she can solve. This protocol is normally used in verifiable voting schemes to
prove that a ciphertext is an encryption of one value within a subset of different values.
Here, we only introduce the basic theory of the CDS protocol; for its technical details,
please refer to [20].
For example, there exists n different questions Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn. The prover P wants
to prove to the verifier V that she knows the solution of one question. But P does not
want V to find out which solution she knows. P can execute the CDS protocol with V as
follow:
1. Suppose P knows the solution δi of the i-th question Qi, P first randomly selects
ri and calculates the genuine witness ti. P then randomly chooses fake challenges
cj, fake responses sj and uses them to fabricate the witnesses tj, where j 6= i. P
sends all these witnesses (t1, t2, . . . , tn) to V .
2. V randomly selects a challenge c∗ and sends it to P .
3. P calculates ci = c∗−
∑
j 6=i cj. Then she calculates the real response si, using ri, ci
and her knowledge δi. After that, P sends (c1, c2, . . . , cn) and (s1, s2, . . . , sn) to V .
4. V checks that c∗ =∑nk=1 ck and for all the questions, each of their proofs is satisfied.
However, V will be unable to distinguish the real proof from the fake proofs.
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4.4 Mixnets
A mixnet is a cryptographic building block implemented by a number of mix servers.
It takes a list of encrypted values as input, and outputs a list of values (encrypted or
decrypted depending on the type of mixnet) corresponding to the input list, but permuted
so the links between individual inputs and outputs are hidden. When the mixnet receives
a number of encrypted values as inputs, each mix server will either partially decrypt (in
a decryption mix) or re-encrypt (in a re-encryption mix) each of the encrypted values
and output the results to the next mix server in a permuted order. Therefore, if there
exists at least one honest mix server, the relationships between the mixnet inputs and
outputs will be kept private. However, the main challenge is how to efficiently prove that
the mixnet has generated the correct outputs without revealing the inputs and outputs
relationships.
In the literature, there are two types of mixnets: decryption mixnets and re-encryption
mixnets. Their difference is that in decryption mixnets, each mix server will partially
decrypt the received encrypted list and the final mixnets outputs are plaintext values.
But in re-encryption mixnets, each mix server re-encrypts the received encrypted list and
the final mixnets outputs are still encrypted values. In general, re-encryption mixnets are
more robust and versatile, because their re-encryption phase and the decryption phase
are separated. And the mix servers only need public information to carry out the re-
encryption phase.
Moreover, there are also two types of methods to verify the correctness of mixnets:
cut-and-choose and efficient proofs. The cut-and-choose method can be used in both de-
cryption mixnets and re-encryption mixnets. For example, we can randomly require half
of the links of the mixnet to be opened in order to check whether the partial decryption or
re-encryption is done properly. However, the challenge is how to design an architecture so
that the opened links still do not reveal the relationships between inputs and outputs—
i.e., there are no chains of opened links that relate inputs to outputs. Another issue is
that if only one value is altered within the mixnets, a single round of the cut-and-choose
method only gives 50% probability to detect the cheating. To increase the probability of
detecting such cheating, we need to run the audit a number of times, but this will make
Normally, this attack does not aim to dramatically change the election result, but to find out how a
voter has voted.
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the verification process expensive. Efficient proofs are more complex and they only work
for re-encryption mixnets. Each mix server generates a transcript proof for the shuﬄe
she has done. The proof proves that no value is added, removed or altered during the
shuﬄe and it can be publicly verified. Otherwise, even if a single value is altered, the
proof will fail with overwhelming probability.
In the following paragraphs, we briefly describe two mixnet examples: one decryption
mixnet verified using the cut-and-choose method, and one re-encryption mixnet verified
using the efficient proofs.
4.4.1 Chaum’s mixnet and Randomised Partial Checking
Chaum’s mixnet [12] works as follows: suppose {(K1, K−11 ), (K2, K−12 ), . . . , (Km, K−1m )}
are a number of key pairs, where Ki is the public key and K
−1
i is the corresponding
secret key (for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m). The public keys are all made public and each secret
key is held by an individual mix server. The mixnet inputs are a list of ciphertexts
L0 = (l01, l02, . . . l0n), where the i-th ciphertext is
l0i = K1(K2(. . . (Km−1(Km(mi, rm), rm−1) . . .), r2), r1)
This ciphertext is commonly known as an onion due to its layered structure. When
receiving the mixnet inputs, the first mix server will use her secret key K−11 to decrypt
each of the onions in L0, and she then removes the randomisation values, shuﬄes the
remaining values and outputs the result list L1 onto the WBB. At this moment, there
should be a value K2(. . . (Km−1(Km(mi, rm), rm−1) . . .), r2) in the list L1. But because of
the shuﬄe, its index will be changed. As follows, the next mix server downloads the list
L1 from the WBB, decrypts each of the ciphertext using her secret key K
−1
2 , removes
the randomisation values, shuﬄes the remaining values and outputs the result list L2
to the WBB. This process is continued until the ciphertext list is decrypted by all the
mix servers. Finally, the last mix server will output the list Lm which contains all the
plaintexts.
Chaum’s mixnet can be verified using Randomised Partial Checking (RPC) [32]. To
enable this, the mixnet needs to be implemented in a slightly different way. Each mix
server needs to implement two shuﬄes and every two adjacent mix servers are paired
together, as show in Figure 1. To audit the mixnet, each pair of the mix servers is
verified separately as follows:
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Figure 1: Randomised Partial Checking
1. For the left mix server, the auditor will go down the middle column and randomly
assigns half units L and the other half units R.
2. For units assigned L, the auditor requires the left mix server to reveal the corre-
sponding links in her first shuﬄe (incoming links).
3. For units assigned R, the auditor requires the left mix server to reveal the corre-
sponding links in her second shuﬄe (outgoing links).
4. For the right mix server, for exactly half of the inputs she receives, their incoming
links have already been revealed. We denote that these units are in the group G1
and the other units are in the group G2. Then the auditor randomly assigns half
units in G1 and half units in G2 and requires the right mix server to reveal their
outgoing links.
5. In the last shuﬄe, for the units whose incoming links have not been revealed, the
right mix server is required to revealed their outgoing links.
To open a link, the mix server needs to reveal either the source of the link (for incoming
links) or the destination of the link (for outgoing links) as well as the randomisation value.
Therefore, the auditor who has access to the public key can re-calculate the link using the
revealed information. Thanks to the above architecture, although half of the links have
been audited, the remaining links still ensure that the inputs and outputs relationships
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are kept private if there exists at least one pair of honest mix servers. In other words, a
mixnet input can be outputted at any index with equal probability.
4.4.2 Neff’s mixnet
Neff’s mixnet [42, 44] works as follows: the original inputs for the mixnet are a list of
ElGamal ciphertexts and each ciphertext is accompanied with a zero-knowledge proof to
prove the knowledge of its plaintext. Before the shuﬄe starts, any input with an invalid
proof will be removed and this process can be publicly verified. After that, the first
mix server downloads the remaining ciphertexts from the WBB (ignores their proofs), re-
encrypts each of the ciphertexts and outputs the results to the WBB in a random order.
Moreover, the mix server also generates an efficient proof to prove that the re-encryption
is correctly performed without revealing the shuﬄe. Such a proof is also published on
the WBB. Then the following mix servers will implement exactly the same processes in
sequence. Finally, the mixnet outputs are published onto the WBB by the last mix server.
The key contribution of Neff’s mixnet is demonstrating how to construct an efficient
proof. Here, we review the basic ideas. For more technical details, the readers are referred
to [42, 44].
Iterated Logarithmic Multiplication Proof Protocol (ILMPP): suppose the
vectors {Xi}ki=1 and {Yi}ki=1 are publicly known, where xi = loggXi and yi = loggYi are
only known to the prover P . Then P can use ILMPP to prove to the verifier V that∏k
i=1 xi =
∏k
i=1 yi without revealing any of the xi and yi.
The Simple k-Shuﬄe: suppose the vectors {Xi}ki=1 and {Yi}ki=1 are publicly known,
where xi = loggXi and yi = loggYi are only known to the prover P . In addition, constants
c ∈ Zq and d ∈ Zq are only known to P , and their commitments C = gc and D = gd are
made public. Then P can prove to the verifier V that Y di = Xcpi(i) for some permutation
pi, without revealing any of the value xi, yi, c, d and pi. Note that P actually proves that
yi/c = xpi(i)/d for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. The protocol works as follows:
• V generates a random challenge t ∈ Zq and sends it to P
The proof prevents the adversary from submitting a ciphertext which is related to another ciphertext
by an honest party. Otherwise, the adversary may use this attack to find out the honest party’s plaintext.
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• P and V publicly compute U = Dt = gdt and W = Ct = gct
• Then, for the public inputs
(X1/U,X2/U, . . . , Xk/U,
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
C,C, . . . , C)
and
(Y1/W, Y2/W, . . . , Yk/W,
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
D,D, . . . , D)
P can use the ILMPP as a subprotocol to prove to V that ck ×∏ki=1(xi − dt) =
dk ×∏ki=1(yi − ct).
Note that if we divide (cd)k at both sides of the above equation, the equation can be
re-written as:
k∏
i=1
(xi/d− t) =
k∏
i=1
(yi/c− t)
Therefore, because t is a random value chosen by V , P actually proves that for some
permutation pi and i = 1, 2, . . . , k, we have yi/c = xpi(i)/d.
ElGamal Shuﬄe: in a mixnet, if the mix server M is honest, for any output j and
some permutation pi, we should always have
(α′j, β
′
j) = (g
rpi(j)αpi(j), y
rpi(j)βpi(j))
To prove the shuﬄe is correctly performed, M first publishes a commitment C and
a random vector {Tj}ki=1, where c = loggC and ti = loggTj. Then M can generate
Uj = T
c
pi(j) and prove that this is correctly performed using the simple k-shuﬄe as a
subprotocol. Finally, M just demonstrates the knowledge of ∆ =∑kj=1 rjtj such that
logg
∏k
j=1(α
′
j)
ui∏k
j=1 α
tic
j
= logy
∏k
j=1(β
′
j)
ui∏k
j=1 β
tic
j
= ∆c
If the above equation holds, it proves two facts: firstly, the same randomisation value has
been used to re-encrypt both αj and βj. And secondly, because
k∑
j=1
rpi(j)tpi(j)c = ∆c =
k∑
j=1
rjtjc
it proves that the same permutation pi has been used both in the simple k-shuﬄe and the
ElGamal shuﬄe.
Note that d = 1 in this case.
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4.5 Other useful techniques
Some other techniques are also sometimes used in designing verifiable voting schemes.
Here we review four of them. The blind signature allows the signer to sign a message
without learning the message content. The designated verifier proof is used to prove some
fact to a designated verifier, but the verifier cannot transfer the proof to others. Plaintext
equivalent test can test whether two ciphertexts are containing the same plaintext without
revealing the plaintext. Proxy re-encryption is used to transfer a ciphertext encrypted
under one public key to a ciphertext encrypted under another public key, where the two
ciphertexts are containing the same plaintext.
4.5.1 Blind signature
Blind signature [13] is a kind of digital signature in which the message is blinded before
it is signed. Therefore, the signer will not learn the message content. Then the signed
message will be unblinded. At this moment, it is similar to a normal digital signature
and it can be publicly checked against the original message. Blind signature can be
implemented using a number of public key encryption schemes. Here, we only introduce
the simplest one, which is based on RSA encryption (see Section 4.1.1). The signer has
a public key is (n, e) and secret key d. Suppose a party A wants to have a message m
signed using the blind signature. She should execute the protocol with the signer S as
follows:
1. A first randomly chooses a value k which satisfies 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and gcd(n, k) = 1.
2. For the message m, A computes m∗ = mke (mod n) and sends m∗ to S.
3. When receives m∗, S computes s∗ = (m∗)d (mod n) and sends s∗ back to A.
4. A computes s = s∗/k (mod n). Now s is S’s signature on the message m.
4.5.2 Designated verifier proof
Designated verifier proof (DVP) [33] can be used to prove some fact, e.g., an ElGamal re-
encryption is performed correctly, to a designated verifier in a way that the proof cannot
be transferred to others.
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Let (p, q, g) be the ElGamal parameters. Suppose sv is the secret key of the verifier
V , and the corresponding public key is yv = gsv . Denote (G,M) = (myα, gα) be the
original message, and (G′,M ′) = (Gyβ,Mgβ) be a re-encrypted message generated by
the prover P . P can prove to V using DVP that the re-encryption is executed properly,
but V cannot use the same proof to convince others about this fact. The key point of
the proof is to prove that G′/G and M ′/M have the same discrete logarithm β under the
bases g and y, respectively. A non-interactive proof of the DVP is as follows:
1. P chooses k, r, t ∈R Zq.
2. P computes (a, b) = (gk, yk) and d = gryvt.
3. P computes c = H(a, b, d,G′,M ′) and u = k − β(c+ r) (mod q).
4. P sends (c, r, t, u) to V .
5. V verifies c = H(gu(M ′/M)c+r, yu(G′/G)c+r, gryvt, G′,M ′).
If P has re-encrypted correctly, the honest V will always accept the proof because:
a = gk = gu+β(c+r) = gugβ(c+r) = gu(M ′/M)c+r
b = yk = yu+β(c+r) = yuyβ(c+r) = yu(G′/G)c+r
Therefore
c = H(a, b, d,G′,M ′) = H(gu(M ′/M)c+r, yu(G′/G)c+r, gryvt, G′,M ′)
In this protocol, d = gryv
t is a trapdoor commitment. If P does not know the secret
key sv, then t and r have been properly committed and P has to calculate u to ensure
the proof will be accepted by V . Since P knows β, she can find out such u. But because
V knows the secret key sv, she can reform d = gryvt as d = gr · gsvt = gr+svt, V is able
to generate a fake proof for any (G¯, M¯) = (m′yθ, gθ) that (G′,M ′) = (myα+β, gα+β) is
the re-encryption of (G¯, M¯). This is because that V can generate any pair (r¯, t¯), where
r + svt ≡ r¯ + sv t¯ (mod q). In this case, V can work as the prover to fabricate a proof.
She first selects (γ¯, δ¯, u¯) and computes
c¯ = H(gu¯(M ′/M¯)γ¯, yu¯(G′/G¯)γ¯, gδ¯, G′,M ′)
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Then V computes r¯ as r¯ = γ¯ − c¯ (mod q), and t¯ to satisfy δ¯ = sv t¯+ r¯ (mod q). As a
result, the verifier will accept (c¯, r¯, t¯, u¯) as the proof because
a¯ = gu¯(M ′/M¯)c¯+r¯ = gu¯(M ′/M¯)γ¯
b¯ = yu¯(G′/G¯)c¯+r¯ = yu¯(G′/G¯)γ¯
d¯ = gr¯yv
t¯ = gr¯+sv t¯ = gδ¯
Therefore
c¯ = H(a¯, b¯, d¯, G′,M ′) = H(gu¯(M ′/M¯)γ¯, yu¯(G′/G¯)γ¯, gδ¯, G′,M ′)
4.5.3 Plaintext equivalent test
Suppose (G1,M1) and (G2,M2) are two ElGamal ciphertexts encrypted under the same
public key, where the private key is threshold shared among a set of parties. The plaintext
equivalent test (PET) [31] is a function to check whether the two ciphertexts are contain-
ing the same plaintext, without revealing it. Denote (ε, ζ) = (G1/G2,M1/M2), therefore
if and only if the two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, (ε, ζ) will represent an en-
cryption of the plaintext integer 1. Each party Pj randomly selects zj ∈ Zq and commits
it using the Pedersen commitment [49]. Then Pj published (εj, ζj) = (ε
zj , ζzj) with the
Chaum-Pedersen proof that (εj, ζj) is well formed. As follows, all parties jointly decrypt
(γ, δ) = (
∏n
j=1 εj,
∏n
j=1 ζj). If and only if the result plaintext is 1, the two ciphertexts
(G1,M1) and (G2,M2) will contain the same plaintext.
4.5.4 Proxy re-encryption
A proxy re-encryption [30] is a function to transfer an ElGamal encryption from one
encryption key to another encryption key. Let (G1,M1) = (m · yr1, gr) be an ElGamal
encryption of a plaintext m using public key y1, and let x1 be the corresponding secret
key, which is shared among a number of parties using a threshold scheme. A quorum Q of
these parties can transfer (G1,M1) to an ElGamal encryption (G2,M2), which contains the
same plaintext with respect to the public key y2, without revealing m. Firstly, Pj selects
a value δj uniformly at random from Zq, and computes (αj, βj) = (M
−x1jLj
1 y2
δj , gδj). Here
x1j is Pj’s share of the secret key and Lj =
∏
i∈Q
i
i−j . Then (G2,M2) can be computed
as (G2,M2) = (G1
∏
j∈Q αj,
∏
j∈Q βj).
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5 Survey of noteworthy schemes
In this section, we review a number of noteworthy verifiable voting schemes. Our purpose
is not to cover every scheme in the literature, but we try to divide the existing schemes
into several categories and we briefly describe one or two typical schemes in each category.
Hopefully, this will give the readers an overview of various research works in developing
verifiable voting schemes.
5.1 Schemes based on blind signature
Schemes based on blind signature were first introduced by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta
in [28], which is normally called the FOO scheme. Although several later papers [46, 47,
45, 11] have introduced various further improvements to the FOO scheme, their election
procedures are similar and the FOO scheme is still widely regarded as the milestone in
this category.
The FOO scheme works as follows: the involved parties are the voters, the adminis-
trator, the counter and the WBB. At first, a certain voter selects her choice v, encrypting
it by bit-commitment {v}k and then by blind signature {{v}k}blind. After that, she sends
it to an administrator. The administrator will only sign the ballot if this voter is eligi-
ble and has not applied the signature before. When the voter receives the signed ballot
{{{v}k}blind}sign from the administrator, she will unblind it {{v}k}sign and send it to
the counter through an anonymous channel. Normally, the anonymous channel is im-
plemented by mixnets. As follows, the counter checks whether the ballot contains the
administrator’s signature. If yes, the counter will put it onto the WBB. Otherwise, she
will reject this ballot. Now, the voter can verify whether her vote {v}k is correctly dis-
played on the WBB. If not, she can complain to a trusted party. Otherwise, she will
send her de-commitment key k to the counter anonymously after some designated time
T . Finally, the counter decrypts each ballot v and publishes them on the WBB.
Schemes based on blind signature ensure voter privacy and allow voters to verify
that their votes are received by the election system. Furthermore, the fairness property
is guaranteed so that no early result can be revealed before the designated time T .
However, they also suffer several drawbacks. One issue is that messages must be sent to
the election authorities twice, which means that voters have to be involved during the
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whole election procedures. Another issue is that voter privacy will be violated if a voter
makes discovers an incorrectly recorded receipt and complains to the authority. Moreover,
if there exists some mixnet for the anonymous channel, then the blind signature technique
is no longer needed to design verifiable voting schemes. Because of these issues, blind
signature schemes have not attracted much recent interest.
5.2 Schemes based on mixnets
Note that the schemes based on mixnets discussed here are early schemes which assume
that voters are able to generate their encrypted votes as well as the necessary proofs.
So they only focus on the tally phase. Many later voter-verifiable schemes also employ
mixnets as building blocks, but they concentrate on a different problem: how to allow
ordinary voters to cast their encrypted votes without special knowledge.
Schemes based on mixnets have been developed along with the mixnets. In the first
mixnet protocol [12], Chaum suggested that the mixnet can be used in voting schemes to
provide voter privacy. And later, many mixnet protocols have used voting as an example
of their application. Here, we describe the scheme introduced by Sako and Kilian in [61],
and many other schemes share similar ideas.
At first, each voter generates an encrypted vote (αi, βi) = (mi · yr, gr) which contains
her choice mi. The voter also generates a Σ-proof (e.g., using the Schnorr Identification
Algorithm) that she knows mi without revealing it. Then she publishes (αi, βi) as well
as the Σ-proof onto the WBB. After receiving all the encrypted votes from every voter, a
set of mix servers will re-encrypt and shuﬄe these votes in sequence. Finally, the mixnet
outputs will be decrypted in a threshold fashion.
For a particular mix server, suppose the list Lin = {(α1, β1), . . . , (αn, βn)} is her inputs
and the list Lout = {(α′pi(1), β′pi(1)), . . . , (α′pi(n), β′pi(n))} is her outputs. To audit this mix
server, she is required to generate another list Lmid = {(α′′σ(1), β′′σ(1)), . . . , (α′′σ(n), β′′σ(n))}
which is also the re-encryption and shuﬄe of the list Lin. Then the verifier can flip a coin.
If heads, the mix server needs to reveal σ and all the necessary randomisation values to
prove that Lmid is a shuﬄe of Lin. Otherwise, if tails, the mix server will reveal pi ◦ σ−1
and all the necessary randomisation values to prove that Lout is a shuﬄe of Lmid. It is
clear that such an audit will not reveal the permutation pi, and it gives 50% probability
of detecting cheating if one vote has been altered during the shuﬄe. Moreover, the audit
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can be repeated for several rounds (each round with an independently generated Lmid)
to increase the probability of detecting cheating. Hence it can be verified that no vote
has been added, altered or removed within the mixnet.
To design a verifiable voting scheme based on mixnet, another challenge is how to
verify that all the mixnet outputs have been correctly decrypted. Normally, the secret
key x is shared among a number of tellers in a threshold fashion as described in Section 4.2,
and ciphertexts are threshold decrypted by a quorum of tellers.
5.3 Schemes based on homomorphic encryption
Schemes based on homomorphic encryption were first introduced by Josh Benaloh in
[19, 7, 5]. Later, several improved schemes (e.g., [6, 21, 22, 36, 3]) were developed. These
schemes follow similar election procedures, but they introduce new security properties,
such as the receipt-freeness, and they use more efficient building blocks to replace those
in Benaloh’s schemes. Here, we review a recent scheme introduced by Baudron et al. in
[3].
Suppose the maximum number of voters is M and there are k candidates. Those
candidates will be assigned the values {M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1} respectively. Suppose also
that a voter wants to vote for the i-th candidate. She first generates a Paillier ciphertext
which encodes M i−1 as well as a proof that her ciphertext is valid. The proof is generated
using the witness hiding protocol (the CDS protocol), and it proves that her plaintext is
within the set {M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1} without revealing which one it is. Then she submits
both the encrypted vote and the proof to the WBB. When the election closes, any vote
with invalid proof will be removed from the tally. As follows, the remaining encrypted
votes will be multiplied together into a single ciphertext. Thanks to the additive homo-
morphic property, this single ciphertext will encode a value R which is the sum of each
individual plaintext. Moreover, the R value can be considered to contain a set of counters
{M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1} and each counter records how many votes have been received for the
corresponding candidate. For example, if a voter votes for the i-th candidate, when her
encrypted vote is aggregated into the single ciphertext, the counter M i−1 will add one.
Note that the ciphertext aggregation does not require any secret information, so anyone
can check whether it is done correctly by performing the calculation again. Finally, the
single ciphertext is decrypted in a threshold fashion and the value R is revealed. At this
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moment, if R is divided by Mk−1, the result is the number of votes received by the k-th
candidate. If the remainder of the previous calculation is divided by Mk−2, we get the
number of votes received by the (k − 1)-th candidate, and so on.
Compared with schemes based on mixnets, schemes based on homomorphic encryption
are much simpler in the tallying phase. However, voters’ tasks are more substantial
because the witness hiding proof is more complex than the Schnorr Identification proof.
Moreover, they are not as versatile as the schemes based on mixnets since they lack
the ability to handle information rich elections such as Single Transferable Vote (STV)
elections. Schemes based on mixnets and homomorphic encryption have received much
recent interest in the literature.
5.4 Specific voter-verifiable schemes
In voter-verifiable schemes, voters are not assumed to have special knowledge to generate
their votes as well as to do any necessary proofs themselves. Instead, some novel tech-
niques can help them to generate their verifiable votes, and they can verify that their
votes correctly encode their intent. We review three noteworthy schemes in this category:
the MarkPledge scheme by Neff [43], a scheme using visual cryptography by Chaum [14],
and Scantegrity II [15]
MarkPledge: Suppose there are n candidates {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} and κ is a security
parameter. The MarkPledge scheme works as follows:
1. An authenticated voter in the voting booth will be allowed to use the voting ma-
chine. This voter tells her choice Ci to the voting machine, and meanwhile, she
gives n − 1 challenges {cj}j 6=i to the voting machine, where each challenge is a κ
bits binary. These challenges are supposed to be generated uniformly random, but
if a voter is coerced to vote for the k-th candidate Ck, he can use the value given
by the coercer to replace ck.
2. The voting machine generates this voter’s ballot which can be illustrated as follows:
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1 2 3 κ
C1 0 1 1 0 0 1 · · · 1 0
C2 0 1 0 1 1 0 · · · 1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ci 1 1 1 1 0 0 · · · 1 1
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Cn 1 0 0 1 0 1 · · · 0 1
Denote 0 and 1 as ElGamal ciphertexts with plaintexts 0 and 1 respectively. If
the voting machine is honest, for the i-th candidate Ci, the voting machine generates
κ pairs of ElGamal ciphertexts, where the plaintext is the same in each pair. But
for all other candidates, it generates κ pairs of ElGamal ciphertexts, where the
plaintext is different in each pair.
3. For the ballot generated in the previous step, the voting machine commits all pledges
how each ElGamal ciphertext pair will be opened. Because for all candidates except
the i-th one, the voting machine has already known how their ElGamal ciphertext
pairs will be challenged, it can announce their pledges properly.
4. The voter then sends the challenge ci for the i-th candidate to the voting machine.
ci is also a κ bits binary.
5. For all candidates, the voting machine reveals the ElGamal ciphertext pairs accord-
ing to the challenge values. For example, for any candidate, if the t-th bit of the
challenge is 0, the voting machine opens the left part in the t-th ElGamal ciphertext
pair. Otherwise, it opens the right part.
6. This voter, as well as any party who interested, can verify that whether all opened
plaintexts match what the voting machine has committed (the pledges) in the third
step.
Later, all the received votes will be tallied using mixnets, which is very similar as in
section 5.2. An attractive property of this scheme is that the voter does not need knowl-
edge of cryptography to follow the election procedures. Later, whether the encrypted
vote is correctly generated can be publicly checked via a cryptographic proof, and this
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will not reveal how the voter has voted. Moreover, adversaries are unable to coerce the
voter to vote for a particular candidate. This is because the voter provides a real proof for
her preferred candidate, and decoy proofs are provided for the other candidates; anyone
who checks the proofs will not know which one is real.
If the voter follows the correct election procedures in the MarkPledge scheme, the en-
crypted vote not only can be cast but also can be used to verify that the voting machine
is honest. For a dishonest voting machine, its cheating behaviour can only go without
being detected with probability 2−κ. However, if the voter does not understand the cor-
rect election procedures and reveals the challenge for her preferred candidate before the
encrypted vote is constructed and how to open the ElGamal ciphertext pairs is pledged,
the voting machine can cheat the voter by generating an encrypted vote for a different
candidate. Moreover, the MarkPledge scheme lacks the ability to handle ranked elections
and the size of its encrypted votes is much larger compared with many other schemes.
Chaum’s visual cryptography scheme: To understand this scheme, some basic
knowledge of Visual Cryptography [41] is necessary. There are two pixel symbols as
shown in Figure 2. If we randomly choose one pixel symbol as the top layer and one pixel
symbol as the bottom layer, and superimpose the two layers, the image can be illustrated
in Figure 3. Thus, if the same pixel symbol occupies the same position in both layers,
the image will be part-transparent. Otherwise, it will be opaque.
Figure 2: Two pixel symbols
As shown in Figure 4, Visual Cryptography can be used to convey information if both
layers are superimposed, but given either the top layer or the bottom layer, it contains
no useful information.
Chaum’s visual cryptography scheme works as follows:
1. In the voting booth, an authenticated voter will be allowed to use the voting ma-
chine. She first reveals her choice to the voting machine.
2. The machine then prints a ballot image, similar as shown in Figure 4. In both layers,
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Figure 3: Two pixel symbols are laminated
Figure 4: An application of visual cryptography
the information (θt, θb) is printed as well. If θt and θb are properly decrypted, they
can be used to constructed the pixel symbols in the top layer and in the bottom
layer respectively.
3. The voter checks whether the image contains her choice. If yes, she randomly
chooses one layer to retain as her receipt, and the other layer needs to be destroyed.
4. Suppose this voter chooses to keep the top layer as her receipt. A copy of this layer
will be published onto the WBB as her encrypted vote. Later, the voter can check
whether the vote in her receipt is displayed on the WBB. If not, she can make a
complaint to a trusted party using her receipt.
To tally this vote, the pixel symbols in the top layer and θb will enable the election
authorities to recover the vote choice. The tallying phase is done using Chaum’s mix [12]
and incorporating Randomised Partial Checking [32] to ensure that this phase is done
properly.
Furthermore, the voter can use her receipt to check whether the ballot has been
Note that she should check that the pixel symbols, θt and θb are all matching.
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correctly generated by the voting machine. The voter first sends θt to the election au-
thorities. Then they decode it and generate its corresponding pixel symbols. Finally, the
voter compares the pixel symbols given by the election authorities and the ones printed
on her receipt. As the retained layer is randomly chosen by the voter, this check gives
the voter at least 50% chance to detect the cheating if the voting machine is dishonest.
In Chaum’s scheme, the voting procedures are straightforward and it has the potential
to handle various election methods (e.g., ranked elections). We will show later that its
user interface can be further improved using the Preˆt a` Voter style ballot forms.
Scantegrity II. This scheme [15] augments existing optical scan voting systems with
voter verifiability. Optical scan systems are already in common use in the U.S.: voters
mark ’bubbles’ on a paper ballot against their choices, and the ballot is read by an optical
scanner, and later tallied. The ballot forms are retained by the system.
Scantegrity II introduces a random secret code (e.g. a 3 character code) with each
bubble. The codes are fixed in advance and pre-committed cryptographically so they
cannot be changed during or after the election. The code is revealed only when that
bubble is marked. This is achieved using invisible ink for the code, and special pens to
mark the bubbles, such that the code is revealed. The voter makes a private note of the
code and ballot serial number, and the ballot form is scanned and retained as before. The
codes received are published against the ballot serial numbers, and the voter can verify if
the published code matches her record. If it does not then she can raise a challenge using
her record of the code—a genuine code from the ballot form is considered as evidence of
casting that vote, since it is extremely unlikely for a voter to guess a genuine code.
Voters can also audit ballot forms using cut-and-choose to check that the codes printed
on them match the pre-committed codes, by revealing all of the codes. Hence voters can
check that ballot forms are correctly formed, and thus verify that their vote has been
captured and recorded correctly.
5.5 Non-crypto schemes
Verifiable voting schemes also can be designed without using cryptography. Here we
describe two interesting examples: one was introduced by Randell and Ryan in [51], and
the other one is the ThreeBallot scheme by Rivest [52].
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Randell & Ryan’s scheme: It is a variant of the Preˆt a` Voter protocol (we will
describe Preˆt a` Voter in more detail in the next section.). The ballot form, as shown in
Figure 5, has a perforation down the middle. The left hand side (LHS) lists the candidate
names in a random order, and the candidate ordering varies in different ballots. At the
bottom of the LHS, there is a unique vote identification number (VIN). The voter will
use the right hand side RHS to mark her choice. At the bottom of the RHS, there is a
number to record the order of the candidate names (OCN), but it is overprinted with a
scratch strip, and the same VIN number is printed on top of the scratch strip.
Figure 5: A ballot form example in the Randell & Ryan scheme
In the polling station, an eligible voter will be given a random ballot. To prevent others
from seeing the candidate ordering, each ballot can be distributed within an envelope.
The voter takes the ballot into the voting booth, marks the choice against her preferred
candidate and separates the ballot along the perforation. Then she keeps the LHS as
her receipt and submits the RHS without removing the scratch surface. Note that the
election officials will only accept a ballot if its scratch surface is intact. Later, the VIN
values for all the received ballots are published on the WBB. The voter can use her receipt
to check whether her VIN number has been correctly recorded. To tally the votes, the
election officials first remove the scratch surface of all received ballots. Then for each
vote, its selected candidate can be retrieved using the position of the mark and the OCN
value.
Apart from casting a ballot, the voter can also audit the ballot. The audit checks
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that the OCN value correctly represents the candidate ordering, and this will prevent a
mark against one candidate being counted as a vote for another candidate. The voter
can audit as many ballots as she likes, but she can only use an unaudited ballot to cast
her vote. The reason is that once a ballot has been audited, its scratch surface will be
removed.
The ThreeBallot scheme: A ballot form, as shown in Figure 6, consists of three
parts which can be separated along the perforations between them. In each part, the
candidate names are listed in the canonical order. But a unique value at the bottom of
each part is different. To cast a vote, the voter should proceed row by row through the
ballot form. Each row corresponds to one candidate, and there are three bubbles in each
row, one on each part. To vote for a candidate, the voter must fill in exactly two of the
bubbles on that candidate row and not to vote for a candidate, she must fill in exactly
one of the bubbles. Then the voter inserts her ballot into some trusted machine which
checks whether the ballot is correctly filled in. If yes, the machine prints some marks
(e.g., a red line) on the ballot to prove it is valid. Otherwise, it will reject the ballot.
Suppose the voter has filled in a valid ballot. Then she separates the ballot along the
perforations, and submits all the three parts to the election officials. At this moment,
the voter is allowed to randomly choose one of three parts, make a photocopy of it and
take the photocopy home as her receipt.
Figure 6: A ballot form example in the ThreeBallot scheme
Later, all the received ballot parts will be published on the WBB. The voter can then
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use her receipt to check whether it is correctly displayed. Otherwise, the receipt can be
used as the proof to make a complaint. Note that if any part of the voter’s ballot has
been altered or removed from the WBB, she will have at least 33% probability to detect
the cheating. Finally, the election result is calculated using the recorded ballot parts on
the WBB, and this process can be publicly verified. Suppose there are n voters, and the
candidates A, B and C have received a, b and c marked bubbles respectively. Then the
actual votes received by each voter is calculated by subtracting n from a, b, c respectively.
Because no complicated crypto technique is used in these non-crypto voting schemes,
they are easy to understand and can be used to explain the basic ideas of verifiable voting
schemes to ordinary people without special knowledge. However, they normally require
much stricter assumptions than their crypto counterparts. For example, in Randell &
Ryan’s scheme, for any received ballot, it is important that its scratch strip is not removed
by dishonest election officials before the tally. Otherwise, this ballot will be treated as in-
valid and it will not be included in the tally. In the ThreeBallot scheme, election integrity
relies on the fact that the machine to check the ballot validity is honest. Moreover, the
election officials should not know which part of the ballot has been photocopied as the
receipt. Otherwise, they can replace the other parts without being detected. Therefore,
the non-crypto schemes are normally viewed as academic proposals rather than practical
proposals.
5.6 Remote voting schemes
All verifiable voting schemes introduced above require voters to cast their votes in the
voting booth. However, this is not convenient for voters who are not able to attend the
voting booth on the election day. To solve this issue, several verifiable remote voting
schemes have been introduced. However, because voters are not protected from adver-
saries when they cast their votes, many of these schemes do not ensure the same security
level as the supervised voting schemes. Here, we describe a novel remote voting scheme
that not only achieves end-to-end verifiability, but also provides very high level coer-
cion protection to the voters. Because this scheme was introduced by Juels, Catalano
Apart from the privacy and receipt-freeness properties offered by many supervised voting schemes,
it also provides protection against three other attacks: the randomisation attack, the forced abstention
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and Jakobsson in [35], it is normally referred as the JCJ scheme. This scheme works as
follows:
1. Registration phase: Before the election, every voter needs to register herself in some
controlled environment. Once being authenticated, the voter Vi will be provided
with a credential σi, which is generated by some trusted party. After that, the
election authorities encrypt this credential using the ElGamal encryption as Epk(σi),
where pk is a public key and its corresponding secret key is threshold shared among
a number of tellers. This ciphertext will be published onto the WBB in a list L.
Then the authorities prove to Vi that this process is executed properly using the
DVP protocol. Note that the voter needs to remember her credential σi, and it
could be used in many different elections.
2. Voting phase: suppose Vi wants to vote for the candidate mi, she calculates two
encrypted values as
c
(1)
i = Epk(mi), c
(2)
i = Epk(σi)
Then Vi submits her vote vi = (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , δi) to the WBB through an anonymous
channel, where δi is a zero-knowledge proof that Vi knows the plaintexts of both
ciphertexts.
3. Tallying phase: after the election day, election authorities collect all received votes
on the WBB. They first check the proof δi of each vote, and any vote with an invalid
proof will be eliminated immediately. Then for the remaining votes which form a
list L1, the authorities perform the Plaintext Equivalent Test (PET) between every
two votes in L1. This process ensures that if several received votes use the same
credential (either valid or invalid), only the last submitted one will be retained and
the others are removed from the list L1. At this moment, the remaining votes form
a list L2. Then the authorities shuﬄes the list L2 using mixnets, resulting a list L
′
2.
As follows, these authorities perform pairwise PET checks between L′2 and L. If
any vote in L′2 cannot be matched with an encrypted credential in L, it means that
this vote contains an invalid credential and it will be removed from L′2. Finally, the
remaining votes form a list L3 and it will be threshold decrypted by a quorum of
tellers to reveal the election result.
attack and the simulation attack.
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Obelix
Asterix
Idefix
Panoramix
7rJ94K
Figure 7: A Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
To see why the JCJ scheme has achieved verifiability, the voter can verify that her
encrypted credential Epk(σi) has been included in the list L and her encrypted vote vi has
reached the WBB. Also, it can be verified by the public that the tallying phase is correctly
performed. If adversaries coerce the voter to reveal her credential, she can simply reveal
a fake one. This is because adversaries cannot distinguish a fake credential from a real
one. Moreover, if adversaries use this fake credential to cast a vote, it will be removed
in the tallying phase but they are unable to find out whether their cast vote has been
removed or not.
6 Preˆt a` Voter
Preˆt a` Voter [17] was inspired by Chaum’s voting scheme [14], replacing the concep-
tually and technologically rather complex visual cryptography with a simpler device of
permuting the candidate order on each ballot. Each voter is given a ballot form with an
independent permutation of candidates printed down the left hand side, and an encryp-
tion of the permutation is printed on the right hand side.
The voting ceremony is as follows. The voter picks a random ballot form at the polling
station. The ballot forms will be sealed in envelopes for privacy. A typical ballot form
is shown in Figure 7. In the privacy of a booth, the voter marks the chosen candidate
on the right hand side of the form. She then separates the two sides and destroys the
LHS. Exiting the booth, she takes the RHS to be scanned and recorded by the system.
The RHS is validated as cast, for example by digital signing and franking by the officials.
This is retained as a receipt which she can later check against a WBB to verify that her
vote has been correctly registered.
Note that due to the permutation of candidates, the vote cannot be inferred from
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the RHS alone without decrypting the onion, so ensuring ballot privacy. Receipt-freeness
relies on destruction of the LHS, hence elimination of the link between the LHS and RHS
of the ballot.
After voting has ceased, the receipts posted to the WBB pass through a series of
anonymising mixes (see Section 4.4). Decrypted votes are then published on the WBB
for public verification. Ballot generation and tabulation are discussed in the following.
The way in which the vote is encoded in the receipt has a number of important
consequences that distinguish it from previous schemes. Firstly, the voter is not required
to communicate her choice to an encryption device. This sidesteps threats arising from
the possibility of a corrupt device leaking information about votes via side-channels or
subliminal channels. Secondly, ballot auditing is very clean: correct encoding of the vote
follows from correct construction of the ballot form. Thus, ballot auditing is performed
on the ballot forms rather than on the receipts, as would be the case for other verifiable
schemes. Whether a ballot form is correctly constructed is a simple binary decision and is
independent of the vote or indeed the voter. Contrast this with earlier schemes: the voter
inputs a choice and the device produces one or more encryptions of this. Suppose that
the voter chooses to audit this: the encryption is opened and the plaintext is compared
with the claimed input. In the event that the voter claims that the decryption does not
match her input, the difficulty is how to distinguish the two situations: the device is
corrupt and has encrypted the wrong vote; or the voter is mistaken or lying about her
input. A further difficulty is that auditing can undermine ballot privacy. Of course, a
voter who intends to audit can input a dummy vote, but this requires a certain level of
understanding that not all voters may possess.
Another way of phrasing this is that in Preˆt a` Voter, what is encrypted is not the
vote itself but rather the (randomised) frame of reference in which the vote is encoded.
This can be performed before the ballot form is associated with a vote or voter.
6.1 Evolution of Preˆt a` Voter
Since its inception, Preˆt a` Voter has undergone a number of changes and a number
of design options have been identified. We focus here on some of the more important
changes and options. This highlights some of the associated issues and challenges. In
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many cases the driving force behind changes to the system has been to address particular
scenarios or contexts, and the additional perceived threats that may become relevant in
those circumstances. Sometimes enhancements are for practical reasons, for example to
improve efficiency of the scheme or the availability of new cryptographic primitives.
6.1.1 Tabulation issues
The original versions of Preˆt a` Voter used RSA decryption mixes. This had the advan-
tage of allowing the receipts to be transformed as they go through the mixes so that they
emerge in the canonical frame of reference. More precisely, the final candidate permu-
tation on the ballot is formed as the product of several permutations, each defined in a
layer of the onion. As a receipt moves through the mix the server reveals the seed value
encrypted at the layer in question, computes the inverse permutation and transforms the
index or vector accordingly. The index/rank vector emerges in the canonical frame or ref-
erence, i.e., in the canonical candidate order. This conveniently removes all information
about the permuted candidate order during the mixing.
The downside of decryption mixes is that they lack robustness and flexibility. Mixing
and tabulation are intertwined: each server must hold a decryption key and the order
of in which votes are decrypted must be pre-determined. Another problem is that the
onions grow in size with the number of mixes and the size of the seed space for each layer.
These considerations led to the introduction of re-encryption mixes and using ElGamal
in place of RSA [58].
With re-encryption mixes, the mixing and decryption phases can be separated. Mix
servers do not require secret keys and their ordering does not need to be pre-determined,
so they can be easily replaced if any one fails. Full mixing of terms in the group is
possible and the onion size is independent of the number of mixes. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, many re-encryption mixes can be run in parallel or sequence. Further, if a mix is
found to be flawed it can be re-run and re-audited fairly easily. As decryption mixes are
deterministic, they cannot be audited or rerun without compromising privacy.
6.1.2 Permutations of the candidate order
A re-encryption mix does not involve (partial) decryption at each stage, so there is no
obvious way to mimic the construction above, i.e., to transform the index/vector while
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preserving the meaning. One possibility is to leave the index/vectors invariant. An
attacker could partition the mix according to the index values with possible privacy
issues, but this is not necessarily a problem if the number of voters greatly outnumbers
the number of voting options. In [58], this is dealt with by restricting to cyclic shifts of
the candidates and exploiting the homomorphic property of ElGamal to absorb the index
into the onion, thereby allowing conventional re-encryption mixes to be used. From a
secrecy point of view this is enough to conceal the choice of a single candidate. It is not
enough to conceal the choice in more elaborate voting methods such as STV. It is also
arguably rather fragile from an integrity point of view: if an adversary has a way to alter
ballots in an undetectable way and he wants to shift votes from one candidate to another
he applies the appropriate shift to the index value.
There have been a number of attempts to go beyond cyclic shifts while employing re-
encryption mixes in Preˆt a` Voter. Ryan and Teague [59] propose use of affine permutations
of the candidate order whilst retaining receipt-freeness. The set of possible permutations
is defined by a shift and a scaling. This (largely) eliminates the shift attack described
above while only using one pair of onions.
An obvious approach to handling full permutations is to introduce n onions per ballot
(where n is the number of candidates) [66, 60]. However, this becomes computationally in-
tensive as the number of candidates grows. Handling full permutations in a re-encryption
mix in a more elegant way is an ongoing research problem.
6.1.3 Leakage of Ballot Information
In the case of Preˆt a` Voter although no device actually learns the voter’s choice, there
is still the possibility of a subliminal channel attack: the entity creating the ballot forms
secretly encodes information about the permutation in the ciphertext by, for example,
selecting the randomisation of the encryption in such a way that a secret keyed hash
applied to the onion leaks information about the candidate order. These are known as
kleptographic attacks [67, 37].
A possible counter to such an attack is the use of pseudo-random, rather than pure
random values. Where ballots are created on demand by a device in the booth, the
randomisation factor of the encryption could for example be derived from a signature
applied to a serial number printed on the ballot, or using Verifiable Random Functions
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[39]. Alternatively, we can use a distributed construction of the ballots in such a way that
no single entity knows sensitive information: the final candidate order, the randomisation
factors etc [10, 9].
6.1.4 Coercion
“Classic” Preˆt a` Voter is vulnerable to certain types of coercion such as randomisation
and “Italian” attacks, particularly with ranked voting methods.
In the randomisation attack, the coercer demands that the voter produces a receipt
with a mark at a pre-specified position, irrespective of which candidate this represents.
This is tricky to counter in any simple way, but if Benaloh challenges are available, the
voter can obtain further receipts until she finds one that allows her to vote as she intends
while satisfying the coercer’s demands. This works quite well for simple elections with
a small number of options on the ballot, but is not feasible for more complex voting
methods such as STV, etc.
6.1.5 Chain-voting
This attack, which is also effective against conventional voting systems, is particularly
virulent in verifiable schemes. An adversary obtains an unused ballot form, marks this
with his chosen candidate and passes it to a voter, who is required to obtain a fresh ballot
at the polling station but to submit the pre-marked form. The coerced voter smuggles
out her unused ballot form, hands it over to the adversary, and so the chain continues.
A possible countermeasure is to use serial numbers on the ballot forms, and for officials
to note the serial number when the ballot form is issued, and to check it before the vote
is cast, similar to the mechanism suggested by Jones [34].
7 Threats to Verifiable Voting Systems
Failure of voters to verify their receipts against the WBB can impact on the integrity of a
system. A possible countermeasure is a Verifiable Encrypted Paper Audit Trail (VEPAT)
mechanism [55] in which hard copies of receipts are stored securely and used to perform
independent checks against the receipts posted to the WBB. Theoretically a VEPAT may
be useful in the event of a dispute but in practice, tracing individual receipts in a large
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election could prove difficult.
In the “Italian” attack, an adversary may demand that the voter fill in the ballot
in a very specific way that serves, with high probability as a unique identifier for that
ballot. This is potentially very effective where there is a large number of options on the
ballot, e.g., STV with a significant number of candidates. Such attacks are particularly
problematic in verifiable schemes in which decrypted ballots are publicly posted. counter-
measures such as lazy decryption [29], can mitigate this by avoiding revealing full ballots
at any stage of the tabulation process, but they are computationally intensive and do not
eliminate all leakage.
7.1 Authentication of receipts
With receipted schemes, anti-faking mechanisms are important both to prevent dishonest
voters from discrediting an election and from a dishonest system cheating voters. Digital
signatures or franking applied to receipts are possibilities but, especially with the former,
can be difficult for voters to verify without easily accessible technology.
Ryan discusses more easily human-verifiable methods such as special printing or pa-
per [56]. In practice both digital signatures and anti-counterfeiting may be necessary:
digital signatures to verify ballot construction, anti-counterfeiting to protect the system
against fraudulent ballot receipts. Possible mechanisms, practical implementation and
associated issues are an important research questions.
7.2 Use of Cryptography
Modern cryptography appears to be perfectly suited to solving the apparent conflict be-
tween verifiability and privacy in voting systems but there are obstacles to its deployment.
Establishing understanding and trust in the mechanisms and guarantees provided by
cryptographic systems is not straightforward. In addition, proper implementation of cryp-
tography can be complicated and problematic. As the privacy afforded by cryptographic
means is usually computational, there may be concerns about the long-term privacy of
votes. Schemes have been devised however, to provide everlasting privacy [65, 40].
An encryption-free, paper-based voting system, conceptually similar to [51] has been
described in Section 5.5. The relative simplicity of the system, together with its similarity
to lottery card games may be helpful in gaining voter confidence and trust.
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8 Conclusion
Conducting elections in a way that ensures that the outcome is demonstrably correct
while at the same time ensuring that all ballots remain secret has been a challenge at the
very foundations of democracy from the outset. The history of democracy is a constant
battle between those who seek to guarantee the integrity of elections and those who
seek to to undermine and corrupt the outcome. Many technologies have been applied to
address this challenge, especially in the US, but none has been wholly successful. More
recently, as described in this chapter, cryptographers and security experts have turned
their attention to the problem. In many ways this presents a unique and especially
demanding challenge: there is no “god’s eye” view to tell us what the correct outcome
of an election should be, and consequently a voting system can fail in a non-manifest
fashion. This is in contrast to most other critical systems, for example Internet banking,
avionics etc. to which voting is sometimes compared. Such comparisons are misleading
however, precisely because in these applications failures are manifest and, in the case of
banking at least, usually correctable.
A number of cryptographically based schemes have emerged in the last few years
which hold out the promise of fully verifiable elections: where the outcome can be proved
correct with minimal trust assumptions. In this chapter we have outlined some of the
most notable and promising of these schemes, along with the cryptographic primitives
required in their construction. Several of these schemes have been implemented and even
trialled. For example the Scantegrity II scheme has been used in municipal elections in
Takoma Park in the US and Preˆt a` Voter is currently being adapted for use in the State
of Victoria in Australia.
Despite the significant advances in verifiable voting, we have yet to see significant
deployment of such schemes. An interesting question then is: why has there been so
little uptake to date? It appears that the main obstacle is the use of cryptography,
which many stake-holders regard with suspicion. Thus, the major challenge now is to
present these schemes in a way that convince the stake-holders of the security properties
they afford. It is true that the concepts underlying “modern cryptography” are subtle
and the arguments showing that verifiable schemes indeed achieve the claimed security
properties are quite sophisticated, so it is unreasonable to expect the average voter to
follow all the details. But then, people routinely use cryptography for Internet shopping
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etc without understanding all the intricacies. It is to be hoped therefore that, properly
presented and after a period of informed debate, verifiable schemes will find their place
in supporting democracy. It would seem sensible to deploy such schemes initially for less
critical elections: officials of student bodies, professional societies etc., before deployment
in real, binding political elections.
Verifiable voting systems remain an active area of research and doubtless there are
further breakthroughs to be made. Various challenges and open questions remain, aside
from the previously mentioned challenge of overcoming the natural aversion to cryptog-
raphy. A prime example is how to perform systematic analysis of a voting system as a
socio-technical system, i.e., a system comprising not only technical components such as
the cryptographic algorithms and protocols, but also humans and procedures etc.
In this chapter we have focussed on polling station/supervised elections. There is
considerable interest in remote, in particular Internet voting. Here the challenges are even
more daunting than for supervised voting and, in particular, there is no way to ensure
that a coercer does not interact with the voter. Some elegant theoretical approaches to
countering coercion in the remote context have been proposed, but it seems fair to say
that none are sufficiently simple and understandable to be effective in practice.
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